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Massimo ReichlinAbstract
A general rationale is presented for withholding and withdrawing medical treatment in end-of-life situations, and an
argument is offered for the moral irrelevance of the distinction, both in the context of pharmaceutical treatments,
such as chemotherapy in cancer, and in the context of life-sustaining treatments, such as the artificial ventilator
in lateral amyotrophic sclerosis. It is argued that this practice is not equivalent to sanctioning voluntary active
euthanasia and that it is not likely to favour it.
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End-of-life situations are among the most prominent
areas of controversy in contemporary bioethics. To this
day, very few countries have taken the radical approach
of accepting the direct termination of life by a medical
practitioner. Most countries stick to the traditional inter-
diction of voluntary active euthanasia. This makes it very
much likely that controversy will continue to centre on
the practice of withholding and withdrawing medical
treatment, with particular reference to life-sustaining
treatments [1]. To withhold or withdraw some forms of
treatment, in fact, is the simplest way to defend patients
from possibly unwanted negative consequences of life-
prolonging medical technology, especially when the pa-
tient’s quality of life lowers dramatically.
Countries such as the US have an established tradition
of legal experience with this sort of medical decision-
making: acceptable standards are clearly defined and
widely accepted, both for competent and incompetent
patients [2]. In Italy, on the contrary, for several cultural
reasons, this practice has not taken root yet: it is not
that decisions to forego medical treatments are in fact
not taken in Italian ICUs, rather that there is no widely
agreed and publicly declared policy for making them.
Evidence of this lack of agreement is provided by the
very large public controversy raised by two cases that
have shaken the public’s conscience in recent years, both
dealing with matters of withdrawing medical treatmentCorrespondence: reichlin.massimo@unisr.it
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unless otherwise stated.at the end of life. In the case of PiergiorgioWelby, the
artificial ventilator was removed from a patient suffering
from lateral amyotrophic sclerosis (LAS), while in the
case of Eluana Englaro artificial nutrition and hydration
(ANH) were withdrawn from a lady who had been lying
in a vegetative state for more than 17 years. Both cases
elicited widespread public debate and charges of sanc-
tioning medical killing were raised against the tribunals
that incriminated neither physician involved.
The public discussion on the Englaro case was domi-
nated by the somewhat bizarre question concerning
whether ANH should be considered a form of therapy;
in fact, the lower courts that had refused several times
to grant the removal of ANH, had declared that only
those medical treatments that count as therapies may be
subject to a judgment of appropriateness and be legally
refused by a competent patient (or by an incompetent
one’s legal attorney). And most of the opposition to the
Supreme Court’s final ruling accepting the removal of
ANH, provided that this was the ascertainable will of the
now irreversibly unconscious patient, centered on the
somehow confused argument that this was not a case of
deciding on the most appropriate use of medical tech-
nology, but of simply providing food and water to an
handicapped person.
The Welby case was not complicated by these highly
questionable assumptions: it clearly concerned life-
prolonging medical treatments and the limits of their
proper use, along with the role to be acknowledged to
the patient’s autonomy in the decision-making process.This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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years and was quadriplegic from twenty-five; he was
competent, adequately informed and firmly decided to
have his will respected. The physician who accepted to
induce ‘terminal’ sedation on him and to switch off the
ventilator was found by the court to have acted in agree-
ment with the professional and legal standards; critics,
however, have stressed the fact that the patient’s explicit
intention to terminate his own life made the case very
similar to one of suicide, and the willing cooperation by
the physician made it a case of voluntary active euthanasia.
The case, therefore, offers the occasion to discuss the
meaning and justifiability of the distinction between ac-
tively terminating a patient’s life and foregoing medical
treatment, as well as of the distinction between withhold-
ing and withdrawing treatments. It does so, moreover, in
the context of a neurodegenerative disease such as LAS, in
which questions concerning the possible limits of the du-
ties to prolong life in the face of a rapidly declining quality
of life arise with particular force.
The moral irrelevance of the distinction between
withholding and withdrawing medical treatment
Let’s start with a very general question. What is the eth-
ical rationale for not doing whatever is technically pos-
sible to do in patients near the end of life? The general
and trivial answer is that not everything that we can do
thanks to biomedical resources promotes the best interests
of patients, nor is for the patients’ good. This answer, of
course, should be made more precise by engaging in a def-
inition of the patient’s good, or of her best interests: how
can these notions be spelled out and who is competent to
define them? These are notoriously difficult problems, but
it is enough to say that, whatever answer one may give to
these questions, one thing is clear: that the patient’s good
is a complex notion, which cannot be reduced to its mere
biomedical dimension [3]. It is one thing to say that
whatever promotes the patient’s biomedical interest,
as ‘objectively’ defined in handbooks of medical therapy, is
a relevant aspect of the patient’s good, and quite another
thing to say that, in every situation, the latter notion can
be identified with the former. This is clearly not so: and
this non-coincidence of the patient’s medical interest with
the patient’s overall good is in fact the source of all ethical
dilemmas in end-of-life medicine and the basic rationale
for accepting the withholding and withdrawing of some
forms of medical treatment.
This general approach has long been accepted and
practised in the context of oncology. There are several
situations, in different forms of cancer, in which the
patient, after the failure of first line treatments, faces
different prospects: either she accepts to initiate some
second- or third-line chemotherapy, with perhaps small
chances of real benefit, or she accepts that nothing morecan be done by way of causal treatment and switches to
some form of palliative care. The ethical rationale of this
widely accepted strategy is that no one can be coerced
into accepting everything that can possibly confer some
medical benefit, however small: it is up to the patient,
who will decide with the help of her physicians and rela-
tives, to say whether she wants to be a ‘fighter’ till the
end, or prefers to live peacefully at home (or in a hospice)
the time that is left. This choice inevitably has to do with
several subjective factors: it depends on the values on
which the patient’s life was built, and perhaps even more
on her character and her general attitude towards life
and its difficulties; it also depends on the quality of the
care the patient is receiving, on how supportive her en-
vironment is, on whether there are familiar or personal
reasons for enduring as much as possible. In accepting
the patient’s decision in a situation like this, the physician
is respecting her capacity to decide for herself what is the
best way to conclude her life: the physician, that is, does
not impose a predefined view of the ‘good death’, and re-
frains from excessively medicalising the final events of
the patient’s life.
In cases like this, there is no rationale for attributing
any moral weight to the distinction between withholding
and withdrawing medical treatment. Let us imagine two
situations: in the first, the patient simply refuses to
undertake one more line of chemotherapy and decides
to switch to palliative care. This is clearly acceptable, on
the basis of the argument just mentioned against impos-
ing unwanted treatment on competent patients. In the
second case, the patient accepts to undergo another line
of chemotherapy: she believes herself to have sufficient
strength to bear the treatment, and perhaps she is also
attracted by the idea of contributing to the experimen-
tation of a new combination of drugs that may prove
useful for herself and/or for future patients. However,
results leave much to be desired. After some time she
feels that her strength is leaving her, that side effects are
too burdensome and that her willingness to hold on is van-
ishing: so she chooses to exit the trial and to switch to pal-
liative care. The same rationale previously accepted for
withholding chemotherapy is clearly valid in this situation:
the patient has tried, but the treatment did not succeed in
bettering her conditions, and perhaps even worsened them.
In the light of the experience, she has come to believe that
her best interests are now served by abandoning the treat-
ment and accepting a non interventionist approach. This is
morally acceptable as well, for the only alternative would
be to put patients in the difficult situation of having to
choose between not accepting a life-prolonging treatment
and accepting it with the implicit commitment not to with-
draw it in any situation. But this is not defensible, since it
would deprive many patients of the benefits of certain
treatments, at least for a certain amount of time.
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might prolong her life for some time, she accepts that her
life will be shorter than it might have been; but to define
the ‘patient’s good’ is in fact to strike a balance between
different competing considerations, including those con-
cerning the quantity and quality of the remaining life. It is
perfectly acceptable to give up some time of one’s life in
order to ‘acquire’ some more ‘quality time’ allowing one to
prepare herself to die in a peaceful way. It is also evident
that the principle governing this kind of medical decision
is utterly different from the one sanctioning voluntary ac-
tive euthanasia (VAE): the rationale for accepting VAE is a
moral principle according to which the patient has a right,
based on autonomy, to decide when to terminate her life
and the capacity to confer to her physician the right to kill
her; the rationale for accepting the withholding and with-
drawing of medical treatment, on the other hand, is a
moral principle according to which the patient has a right
to decide the therapies she is willing to accept and those
she does not want.
Discussion
Is this general rationale for withholding and withdrawing
pharmaceutical treatment in the context of oncologic
disease also applicable to life-sustaining medical tech-
nology, such as the artificial ventilator in situations in
which the patient is unable to breathe spontaneously?
In particular, does the moral irrelevance of the distinc-
tion between withholding and withdrawing hold in these
contexts as well? One possible reason to deny that the
moral irrelevance thesis holds with reference to such life-
prolonging treatments as artificial ventilation is the fact
that, whereas withdrawing chemotherapy in the oncology
case does not have a direct, immediate effect on the pa-
tient’s life, and may even produce better overall conse-
quences, withdrawing ventilatory support from a patient
suffering from LAS, or otherwise unable to breathe spon-
taneously, has the direct effect of bringing about the
patient’s death [4]. Thus - it could be argued - while with-
drawing chemotherapy is acceptable because it does not
imply any direct killing of the patient, withdrawing artifi-
cial ventilation is impermissible because it amounts to
VAE. According to this view, the distinction between
withholding and withdrawing becomes morally relevant
in this case, because in the former the physician refrains
from intervening and cannot be considered the cause of
the patient’s death, whereas in the latter the act of turn-
ing off the ventilator is the causally decisive factor for the
termination of the patient’s life.
This reasoning, however, is far from being convincing.
In fact, it relies very heavily on a literal interpretation of
the distinction between acts and omissions, assuming
that everything that counts as an omission is, ‘by this
very reason’, acceptable, and everything that counts asan action is thereby impermissible, so long as its effect is
the patient’s death. Contemporary discussion, however,
has shown that some cases of letting a patient die are
just as morally problematic as cases of directly killing:
for example, when cardiac surgery is withheld in a new-
born whose Down’s syndrome was not detected by ultra-
sonic scans, it is clear that the treatment would be
appropriate and effective, and the intention, in omitting
it, is to terminate the baby’s life. Therefore, it cannot be
the mere distinction between acting and not acting that
makes a moral difference, rather the conditions in which
actions and omissions take place. In the case under con-
sideration, not to initiate mechanical ventilation is caus-
ally equivalent to terminating its use, since the patient is
unable to breathe spontaneously and the ventilator is the
only available means to prolong her life. The physician
who, accepting an advance directive (or the present re-
fusal by the patient), refrains from initiating the ventila-
tor treatment is thereby accepting that the patient’s
death will follow in a short while. What justifies this de-
cision is not the physician’s doing nothing, but the fact
that the patient and the physician are agreed that the
benefits to be gained by insisting on the treatment do
not justify the burdens that it imposes on the patient,
considering her situation and quality of life.
Now, if this is a valid rationale for withholding mech-
anical ventilation in certain cases, it is valid for with-
drawing it as well. In fact, the patient and the physician
are agreed that the treatment is now imposing more
burdens than benefits to the patient and that, after
resisting the disease for so long, it is time to surrender
to it, for prolonging life in this situation would not be in
the patient’s best interest. This is not equivalent to
accepting that the patient has a right to the termination
of her life and that the physician is justified in killing
her; those who claim that no moral difference exists be-
tween killing and letting die [5-7] fail to see that the
principle governing the action in withdrawing ventilatory
support is the respect of the patient’s will concerning
medical therapy, not the respect of the patient’s decision
to terminate her life [8]. This fine-grained distinction
was partly obscured in the case of PiergiorgioWelby by
the patient’s explicit request of VAE. But the physician
who switched off the respirator declared that he was act-
ing upon the moral principle that obligates physicians
not to impose unwanted treatments on their patients
and denied having practised euthanasia. Such constraint
against imposing medical treatments on unwilling pa-
tients is also the Constitutional principle to which the
physician’s lawyer in fact appealed in front of the Court.
One possible objection to this reasoning is that, assum-
ing that the legalisation of VAE is not desirable, accept-
ing the withholding and withdrawing of life-prolonging
medical treatments can all too easily become the first
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ceptance of medical killing. Slippery slope arguments
are notoriously very difficult to assess, for long term con-
sequences are often highly speculative and the causal link
between them and what we decide today is not easy to
establish. Nonetheless, I believe that these arguments
have some weight and that we should act with the utmost
prudence in the context of end-of-life decisions. How-
ever, it is vital to take into account all the consequences
of the different options. So, even if we could not exclude
a slippery slope towards euthanasia, we should nonethe-
less evaluate the consequences of not accepting the inter-
pretation offered thus far. These are that life-prolonging
treatments would become mandatory and the power to
artificially sustain human life would become a sort of
technological cage from which patients could never es-
cape. In other words, the result would be to transform
technological opportunities into unconditionally binding
moral imperatives – something certainly not desirable. If
we wish to avoid the ‘technological cage’ result, we have
strong reasons to accept the difference between with-
drawing life-prolonging treatment and actively terminat-
ing the patient’s life. Of course, someone may add that
other conditions, in themselves just as miserable, do not
depend on technological support for their prolongation.
For example, if a patient is quadriplegic but has no need
for artificial ventilation, shouldn’t we accept her request
to be released from this situation as well? I am not sug-
gesting that to answer in the affirmative may not be a
plausible move. I just want to stress that such an answer
is not implied by the acceptance of a general principle
against imposing unwanted treatment. To decide whether
to impose or not a medical treatment is a medical decision
that has to do with the physician-patient relationship:
to decide whether to kill a patient whose life needs no
medical treatment is an altogether different, perhaps
‘existential’ kind of decision.
Sliding from one kind of decision to the other is not
impossible. Nonetheless, there is no direct link between
accepting the withholding and withdrawing of life-
prolonging treatments and accepting VAE. And insisting
that the two practices belong to distinct areas of human
action, and may be justified by different moral principles,
should be effective in keeping them distinct and avoiding
any sliding from one to the other.
Conclusions
In conclusion, I believe we have quite good reasons for
endorsing the interpretation of the moral and legal prin-
ciples governing the use of life-prolonging means that
was sanctioned by both Welby and Englaro cases: to
grant patients a consistent opportunity to withhold and
withdraw all kinds of medical treatments is in fact to
confer them a substantial warrant against the unwantedconsequences of medical development and may weaken
the drive towards the much more problematic option of
changing existing regulations concerning the direct kill-
ing of patients.
Competing interests
The author declares that he has no competing interests.
Received: 13 June 2014 Accepted: 8 July 2014
Published: 16 July 2014
References
1. British Medical Association: Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Prolonging
Medical Treatment: Guidance for Decision-Making. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing; 2007.
2. American Medical Association: Decisions near the end of life. JAMA 1992,
267:2229–2233.
3. Pellegrino ED, Thomasma DC: For the patient’s Good: The Restoration of
Beneficence in Medical Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press; 1988.
4. Rady MY, Verhaijde JL: End-of-life discontinuation of destination therapy
with cardiac and ventilatory support medical devices: physician-assisted
death or allowing the patient to die? BMC Med Ethics 2010, 11:15.
5. Rachels J: The end of life: euthanasia and morality. New York: Oxford
University Press; 1986.
6. Brock DW: A critique of three objections to physician-assisted suicide.
Ethics 1999, 109:519–547.
7. Shaw D: The body as unwarranted life support: a new perspective on
euthanasia. J Med Ethics 2007, 33:519–521.
8. Szalados JE: Discontinuation of mechanical ventilation at end-of-life: the
ethical and legal boundaries of physician conduct in termination of life
support. Crit Care Clin 2007, 23:317–337.
doi:10.1186/2049-6958-9-39
Cite this article as: Reichlin: On the ethics of withholding and
withdrawing medical treatment. Multidisciplinary Respiratory Medicine
2014 9:39.Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
